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Abstract: This paper reports on the 40-year experience of academia-industry interfacing in the 
operations research (OR) field in Montreal. We focus on five spin-off companies that academic 
entrepreneurs from the CIRRELT and the GERAD created between 1976 and 2003: INRO 
Consultants, GIRO, AD OPT, Omega Optimisation/Planora, and ExPretio. The importance of 
university spin-offs for knowledge transfer is well documented in fields such as biology and 
nanotechnology; however, few papers have studied university spin-offs in OR. Yet, OR has an 
enormous impact on society, and university spin-off firms play a key role in the diffusion of 
research to the world of practitioners. In this paper, we tell the story of five companies created by 
academics from two world-renowned OR research centers based in Montreal, and we derive 
lessons about academia-industry interfacing in the OR field. By so doing, we hope to improve 
our understanding of the creation of fruitful relationships between academics and OR 
practitioners.   
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The Art & Science of Practice:  
Academia-Industry Interfacing in Operations Research in Montreal 
 
Many companies, particularly in the transportation and telecommunications sectors, depend on 
operations research (OR) for their operations and survival. The existence of journals such as 
Interfaces, which aims to publish “papers describing real-world problems and their practical 
solutions” (Bollapragada 2011), offers further evidence of the lasting interest of operations 
researchers in real applications. Most Interfaces papers describe successful OR implementations 
and report on the actual practice of OR and its impact on real organizations; however, relatively 
few have investigated the factors that make these implementations possible; see Miller (2010) for 
an exception. We therefore still know relatively little about how operations researchers manage 
the interface between academia and practice. An important factor that enables the successful 
application of OR techniques within organizations is the existence of collaborations between 
academics and practitioners, which sometimes take the form of spin-off companies. Management 
scholars have long studied the importance of university spin-offs in knowledge transfer (Vohora 
et al. 2004), but they have usually focused on fields such as biology or nanotechnology.  
In this paper, we study the experience of academia-industry interfacing in OR in 
Montreal where two leading OR research centers are located: the Interuniversity Research Centre 
on Enterprise Networks, Logistics and Transportation (CIRRELT), formerly the Centre for 
Research in Transportation (CRT), and the Group for Research in Decision Analysis (GERAD). 
We focus on five spin-off companies, which CIRRELT and GERAD researchers created 
between the 1970s and the early 2000s: INRO Consultants (http://www.inrosoftware.com/), the 
Informatics and Operations Research Group (GIRO) (http://www.giro.ca/en/), AD OPT 
(http://www.ad-opt.com/), Omega Optimisation/Planora, now the research division of JDA 
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(http;//www.jda.com), and ExPretio (http://www.expretio.com/). In reporting on the development 
of these spin-offs over the past 40 years, we provide insights into their contribution to knowledge 
development and transfer.  
Operations Research in Montreal: 40 Years of Research Excellence  
Teaching and research activities in the OR field in Montreal are spread among seven institutions: 
Concordia University, McGill University, Université de Montréal (UdeM), Université du Québec 
à Montréal (UQÀM), HEC Montréal, Polytechnique Montréal, and École de Technologie 
Supérieure. HEC, a business school, and Polytechnique, an engineering school, are affiliated 
schools of UdeM. Approximately 50 Montreal-based professors conduct research in OR. The 
exact number is difficult to ascertain because the frontiers between OR and related fields, such as 
computer science, mathematics, industrial engineering and operations management, are fuzzy.  
The Montreal OR community is widely recognized as a world leader in OR, as evidenced 
by the number of prizes and honors awarded to its professors and graduate students, the number 
of publications in leading OR journals by these professors and students and citations to these 
publications, and the community's impact on practice. Two of the eleven awardees of the Robert 
Herman Lifetime Achievement Award (INFORMS Transportation Science and Logistics 
Section) and two Edelman finalists are part of the Montreal OR community. This community is 
very active and encompasses some of the most productive authors in the operation research and 
management science (OR/MS) field (Hsieh and Chang 2010). UdeM is the third most-featured 
organization in the four leading transportation journals, which are the main areas of expertise of 
the CIRRETL and GERAD. These journals are Transportation Science, Transportation Research 
Part B: Methodological, Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies, and 
Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation. Between 1970 and 2015, these 
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journals published 193 articles from UdeM, 52 from HEC Montréal, and 49 from Polytechnique 
Montréal, a total of 294 articles (6.13 percent, n=4,796). This makes the Montreal OR 
community the second most-featured community in these journals; the University of California 
System, which comprises nine campuses, ranks first.   
The Montreal OR community has also had a major impact on organizational practices, as 
evidenced by its rankings in the Rothkopf rankings, which rank academic institutions according 
to their contributions to the INFORMS practice literature. In the 1999 edition of the ranking, 
UdeM ranked fifth and HEC Montréal ranked eighth. Polytechnique Montréal ranked eleventh 
and sixth in the 2004 and 2007 editions, respectively (Rothkopf 1999, Rothkopf 2004, Rothkopf 
2007). Our search, using the Web of Science database, shows that three Montreal-based 
universities are at the top of the list of the organizations featured in the articles published in 
Interfaces between 2000 and 2015. The impact of the Montreal OR community on the region is 
also visible through the creation of five university spin-offs since the late 1970s. These spin-offs 
have contributed to the worldwide dissemination of research results (i.e., commercial products) 
in companies and public organizations. Locally, they have generated more than 600 jobs.  
The Role of Interuniversity Research Centers in Research Excellence 
Research excellence in OR in Montreal is facilitated by two research centers, the CIRRELT and 
the GERAD, which carry out fundamental algorithmic and applied research in transportation 
network planning, scheduling, location, energy planning, combinatorial optimization, 
mathematical programming, and related fields. These multiple-university research centers help 
create an OR community that spans the universities. They also facilitate cooperation between 
their members, help generate funding, and increase the visibility of Montreal-based OR research 
worldwide.  
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The CRT, the first OR research center in Montreal, was formed in 1971 with a seed grant 
from the Ford Foundation to conduct interdisciplinary research activities in the field of 
transportation planning; OR was the main discipline. In 2006, the CRT merged with several OR 
groups from Montreal to become the CIRRELT. The main objectives of the CIRRELT are to 
carry out research, train students, transfer knowledge, and support policy and decision making). 
The GERAD was founded in 1979 to conduct research in quantitative decision making, with a 
strong slant toward transportation.  
The main research activities of the CIRRELT and the GERAD are financed primarily by 
their supporting institutions (e.g., HEC Montréal, Polytechnique Montréal, UdeM) and by federal 
and provincial granting agencies, such as the National Science and Engineering Research 
Council Canada (NSERC) and the Fonds de Recherche du Québec (FQRNT). Only a few 
research contracts are exclusively funded by industrial partners; however, some government 
grants, such as the grants from the MITACS (a Canadian not-for-profit organization), require a 
partnership with industrial partners and play an important role in supporting the research carried 
out at the CIRRELT and GERAD. In addition, the federal and provincial governments provide 
fiscal incentives to promote university-enterprise collaborations. Finally, the host universities, 
which view the emergence of spin-offs favorably, conclude agreements with the companies 
regarding royalties, and welcome research partnerships with their spin-offs through collaborative 
university-industry research contracts.  
Successful Examples of Academia-Industry Interfacing: Montreal’s 
University Spin-Offs 
A spin-off company is “a new venture that is dependent upon licensing or assignment of the 
institution’s intellectual property for initiation” (Lockett and Wright 2005, p. 1044). This 
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definition, however, excludes companies founded by graduates or university researchers who are 
not linked to the university through a license or an intellectual property (IP) contract. In this 
paper, we retain a broader definition of spin-off; we include companies founded by university 
researchers or students, whatever the type of initial contract they had with the university. We 
focus on five spin-offs, created by CIRRELT and GERAD researchers, which have reached a 
sustainable stage: INRO, GIRO, AD OPT Technology, Omega Optimisation/Planora, and 
ExPretio Technologies. Table 1 provides an overview of these five spin-offs.  
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
Below, we report on the creation, growth, and development of these spin-offs from their 
date of creation until 2012. To this end, we collected data in 11 face-to-face interviews with the 
founders of the companies and some of their colleagues (Table 2). We then complemented these 
interviews with publicly available information and documentation that the interviewees 
provided. 
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
First Experiences of Academia-Industry Interfacing: INRO Consultants and GIRO  
INRO Consultants is a privately held company created in 1976 by Michael Florian, an OR 
professor from UdeM, who specializes in traffic control and transport planning. In the late 1970s, 
valorization of research was not yet a priority at UdeM. Professor Florian, who was the first 
director of the CRT, acted as a pioneer when he decided to create INRO Consultants to help CRT 
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researchers commercialize their innovations. INRO’s first success occurred in the mid-1980s 
with the commercialization of EMME/2, traffic-assignment and demand-forecasting software 
that was linked directly to the research conducted by the founder of INRO and his colleagues 
(Florian 1977, Florian and Nguyen 1978, Florian and Spiess 1983). Since then, INRO has 
developed two other core products, STAN, a strategic freight-planning software package, and 
DYNAMEC, a dynamic-traffic-assignment software package. Similar to EMME/2, these 
products build on research carried out on transportation-network models, which the INRO 
founder and his colleagues conducted.   
INRO products are used by thousands of transportation planners in more than 2,500 cities 
and 80 countries. Thanks to the reputation of its products, INRO has been involved in many 
important projects, such as the road investment project for the Vancouver 2010 Olympics. Cities 
such as London and Hong Kong use its software to manage their congestion-pricing and transit 
fares. INRO is still based in Montreal and its 35 employees contribute to the development and 
commercialization of its products, and to the facilitation of a community of users worldwide.  
GIRO was created in 1979 by Jean-Marc Rousseau, who was then the director of the 
CRT, and by one of his doctoral students. The two researchers created GIRO to commercialize a 
vehicle and operator-scheduling system, HASTUS, which they had developed in partnership 
with the Montreal Transit Company (Roy and Filion 2005).  
The GIRO founders published several academic papers based on their research (Blais et 
al. 1990) and received an award from the Canadian Operations Research Society for the 
development of HASTUS (Blais and Rousseau 1982); they also created a sustainable company. 
More than 35 years after its development, HASTUS remains GIRO’s core product; the firm also 
commercializes two other products: GeoRoute, routing and scheduling-management software for 
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services such as postal operations and waste collection, and GIRO/ACCESS, a paratransit and 
transit of disabled-person scheduling software. The company sells its products to more than 200 
organizations in 25 countries worldwide (e.g., Long Island Railroad in New York City, SBS 
Transit in Singapore, the Victoria Department of Transport in Melbourne, Skyss in Bergen, 
Norway). It has approximately 300 employees and 12 shareholders, and generated a turnover of 
CAD$56 million in 2013-2014 (Proulx 2015).  
The Second Wave of Academia-Industry Interfacing: AD OPT  
AD OPT was founded in 1987 by François Soumis, an OR professor from Polytechnique 
Montréal and member of the GERAD, who specializes in air transportation problems, two MSc 
students, and two colleagues from the CRT. In the late 1970s, these researchers developed a new 
optimization strategy, GENCOL for column generation, which allows a huge number of 
variables to be considered in solving large-scale integer linear programs (Desaulniers et al. 2005, 
Desrochers and Soumis 1989, Desrosiers et al. 2000, Desrosiers 2001, Lacroix and Desrosiers 
2004). The GENCOL technology quickly became successful, and its inventors received awards 
from the European Association of Operational Research in 1983 and from the Operations 
Research Society of America in 1986 (Roy and Filion 2004a, 2004b).  
Through a partnership with Air France and GIRO, the designers of GENCOL were able 
to move from a prototype to a commercial product. In 1987, they created AD OPT to sell their 
product to clients, such as Air Transat and UPS. Whereas the GENCOL technology was initially 
developed for the mining sector (Desrosiers 2010), the founders of AD OPT concentrated on the 
airline industry. Over time, AD OPT has developed a suite of crew-planning and scheduling 
solutions customized for this industry; these solutions include Altitude Pairing, a software 
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optimizer for crew-member pairing problems, Altitude PBS, a software optimizer for monthly 
crew blocks, and Altitude VBS, a bidding system that creates crew vacation timetables.  
The founders of AD OPT originally adopted an organic growth strategy. In the mid-
1990s, however, they turned to venture capitalists to acquire Carmen Systems, a division of 
Volvo. After being incorporated in 1994 and listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange in 1999, AD 
OPT launched in a series of acquisitions (e.g., Totalcare of Kelown in 2001, Mercury Scheduling 
of Vancouver in 2003). But, in 2004, KRONOS Inc, a U.S. software company acquired AD OPT 
for $68,200,000. At that time, the AD OPT turnover was approximately CAD$300,000 per year. 
AD OPT has since become the airline crew-planning division of Kronos. It is still based in 
Montreal, and its founders estimate that it has generated approximately 200 full-time jobs since 
its creation (Interview #5). Despite this acquisition, Kronos has kept the AD OPT name because 
of its excellent reputation among corporate clients.  
Academia-Industry Renewal: Omega Optimization/Planora (2002) and ExPretio (2007) 
Omega Optimization/Planora is a workforce optimization company that develops and sells 
optimization software for personnel scheduling in a wide range of market segments (e.g., 
hospitals, retail stores). When the company was created in 2001-2002, its two founders, Louis-
Martin Rousseau and a fellow student, were both PhD students in OR at UdeM. Rousseau was 
experiencing delays in his doctoral research because he had to wait for some license renewals; he 
decided to use this free time to apply his skills in constraint programming to personnel rostering 
problems. Because he was convinced that his research had some commercial opportunities, he 
enlisted another PhD student in his project. Together, they enhanced the prototype and launched 
Omega Optimization. Omega Optimization’s core product, originally called OpTime, is thus 
closely associated with the research of its founders (Rousseau et al. 2002, Côté et al. 2103).  
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Omega Optimization initially worked in partnership with a software company responsible 
for developing and maintaining the interface, doing market research, and managing the 
relationship with Omega Optimization’s clients. As a result of this partnership, Omega acquired 
its first clients, two hospitals from the Montreal area and the Labatt brewery in Montreal 
(Interviews #8 and #9). Between 2002 and 2007, the company experienced slow but steady 
growth with more employees and larger contracts from clients in Quebec, such as the Federation 
of Milk Producers and Dairy Farms. In 2009, two years after Omega Optimization ended its 
partnership with the software company, it benefited from a massive injection of funds and 
commercialized its new product, Planora™. Between 2010 and 2014, many changes occurred. In 
2010, it turned to an investment fund to gain access to capital and grow further (e.g., its 
shareholder number grew from three in 2007 to six in 2010); in 2011, it was renamed Planora. In 
July 2012, RedPrairie, a large U.S. company specializing in supply chain management solutions 
acquired Planora, just before RedPrairie merged with JDA in late 2012. Since then, Planora, 
which employs approximately 40 persons, has been the research lab of JDA.   
ExPretio is a privately owned company headquartered in Montreal and specializing in 
revenue-optimization and pricing solutions in the airline and railway industries. It was founded 
in 2003 by a group of four OR academics from Canada, France, and Belgium specializing in 
bilevel optimization algorithms in the transport sector: Gilles Savard (CIRRELT, Polytechnique 
Montréal), Patrice Marcotte (DIRO, UdeM), and two European colleagues. The idea of creating 
a company to commercialize the new algorithm that the researchers had codeveloped came in the 
late 1990s, after the four researchers coauthored a paper in Management Science (Labbé et al. 
1998) and another one in Transportation Science (Brotcorne et al. 2000). ExPretio’s core product 
is thus directly based on the output of this research. The four academics founded ExPretio in 
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2003 with the help of a UdeM graduate and former AD OPT vice president, who provided funds 
and became ExPretio’s CEO. A former PhD student of one of the lead academics joined as chief 
technology officer. The French national railway company, SNCF, which had an interest in the 
technology since its beginning, joined the venture as one of its subsidiary companies (Interviews 
#10 and #11). 
ExPretio was located initially at Polytechnique Montréal, but it left the university 
premises in 2007. It currently employs 35 persons and has seven shareholders. Its core product, 
APPIA, is sold worldwide to rail industry clients, such as the SNCF, Thalys, Renfe, and NTV.   
Overcoming Critical Junctures: A Comparison of the Five Montreal Spin-offs 
The growth trajectory of university spin-offs is usually not linear. Moving from one stage (e.g., 
opportunity recognition) to another (e.g., commercialization) is critical to the survival of the 
venture (Vohora et al. 2004). Although such moves enable new ventures to grow, they put them 
at risk because a new configuration of resources, capabilities, and network ties are required 
(Wright et al. 2004, p. 289). Below, we compare the ways in which the five Montreal spin-offs 
have overcome a series of critical junctures and have become sustainable. 
First Critical Juncture: Opportunity Recognition 
Most university spin-offs face an opportunity-recognition critical juncture when academic 
entrepreneurs who are convinced of the value of their research must identify whether a market 
opportunity exists (Vohora et al. 2004). Academic entrepreneurs have to find a way to match 
their discoveries with an “unfulfilled market need and a solution that satisfies the need” (Vohora 
et al. 2004, p. 160). In many cases, this match is not easy to find, because academic 
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entrepreneurs usually have limited knowledge of market needs and cannot easily evaluate the 
potential commercial value of their research.   
For the Montreal spin-offs, this market-knowledge barrier was lower because the 
academic entrepreneurs had developed partnerships with industry partners, through personal 
contact or during conferences (Interview #4), before launching their new venture. In some of the 
cases that we study, the industry partnership was a requirement of the government, which was 
financing the research through a specific type of grant that required the spin-off to have industry 
partners (Interview #5). This type of partnership enables researchers to gather some knowledge 
of industry needs and helps them to move from a prototype to a commercial product. The cases 
of INRO, GIRO, and ExPretio illustrate how the lead researchers developed knowledge of 
market needs through industry partnerships. In the case of INRO, the research was initially 
financially supported by the Transport Canada central research and development branch. The 
lead researcher quickly became aware that no one in Canada had ever developed the model his 
research team was developing. He also realized that to further develop the technology, his team 
would need to create its own software package, because no existing software could integrate the 
powerful algorithm the team it had developed (Interview #1). He thus decided to work closely 
with potential users, such as the city of Winnipeg, to develop a prototype. Eventually, as some 
partners asked how much the software would cost, he realized that a market opportunity existed 
for the technology:  
“And then people started to ask ‘How much does it cost?’ Then we did two pilot 
implementations: one in Stockholm where we had very good collaborators, and one 
in Portland, Oregon in the United States. We then did another pilot implementation 
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in Ottawa for public transit. We then realized that there was a market and we 
decided to negotiate the distribution rights with the university […]” (Interview #1).  
A similar story of collaborative research with industry partners developed through the 
personal contacts of GIRO's founders. The creators of HASTUS did not initially think about 
creating a spin-off, but wanted to conduct relevant research:   
“The creation of GIRO is the result of several unpredictable events […]. The idea of 
developing a piece of software emerged when I joined the university in 1973. My 
first MSc student worked in the computer science department of the Montreal 
transit company. I asked him to see whether he could identify an interesting 
operations research problem within the company. He came back with a driver-
scheduling problem, which was rather complicated because of all kinds of complex 
collective agreement rules” (Interview #4).  
Three years after the development of the first version of HASTUS, the Montreal transit 
company signed a contract with the designers of HASTUS and asked them for an updated 
version of the software. It renewed its contract for HASTUS in 1978 and, when the researchers 
proved to the transit company that it could save 3 percent of its labor cost by using HASTUS, it 
decided to finance a larger research project with the support of the Quebec Ministry of Transport. 
The designers of HASTUS then realized that other companies might be interested in their 
software and they established GIRO (Roy and Filion 2005).   
The case of ExPretio differs slightly. The academic entrepreneurs were quickly 
convinced of the potential commercial value of their research; however, they decided to wait 
until they had found an industry partner committed to support them financially. This opportunity 
occurred four years after they first had the idea to establish a venture:   
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“As far as I am concerned, we had decided in 1999 to start a company. Our business 
plan was ‘Let’s go ahead when we have a customer.’ Because we did not want to 
rely only on consulting activities, we had to have a product. So we waited until we 
had our first customer who was willing to invest in the development of the product” 
(Interview #11). 
Another reason that the Montreal academic entrepreneurs successfully overcame the 
opportunity-recognition critical juncture was because their innovations were not disruptive; they 
were sustaining innovations—innovations that substantially improve the existing technology and 
provide better value in an existing market. In all five cases, as a result of the high level and 
robustness of the academic research that supported them, the technologies were far more 
advanced than those incorporated in the software available in the market. The value of these 
technologies thus was not because they solved new problems, but because the research teams had 
developed better techniques to solve existing optimization problems. A technology's nature can 
make a significant difference: identifying market opportunities for sustaining innovations is 
easier than for disruptive innovations, because the market already exists and the new product can 
be benchmarked against existing products.  
Second Critical Juncture: Entrepreneurial Commitment 
Recognizing a market opportunity is important; however, taking an idea forward and creating a 
company that commercializes this opportunity is also necessary. The academic entrepreneurs 
must have persistence, take actions, and show commitment. Entrepreneurial commitment is thus 
the second critical juncture that academic entrepreneurs face. Academics who have identified a 
market opportunity have to firmly commit to creating a spin-off; in doing so, they usually face a 
series of challenges. They must deal with the operational, managerial, and financial aspects of 
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the project. They also must accept risks, overcome their lack of prior business experience, and 
attract competent managers (Vohora et al. 2004). They may also have to deal with reluctance 
from within their academic environment. All these elements put at risk their willingness to 
commit to the commercialization project.  
The academic entrepreneurs who established the Montreal spin-offs operated in a 
professional environment in which their colleagues were relatively supportive of their projects to 
develop ventures. In the late 1970s, when GIRO and INRO were established, UdeM and 
Polytechnique Montréal did not have a policy that addressed how academics could 
commercialize their research output; however, the climate was favorable. The two academics 
who founded GIRO and INRO had high-level positions in their universities, and they were 
directors of the CRT. In 1987, when AD OPT was created, UdeM and Polytechnique Montréal 
were encouraging collaborations with industry partners. In 1982-1983, UdeM launched a funding 
campaign directed toward large companies (Roy and Filion 2004b). Moreover, the Canadian 
government was providing incentives to academics to collaborate with industry, through specific 
grant programs that required industry partners. Finally, in the cases of Omega 
Optimization/Planora and ExPretio, both created in the early 2000s, the institutional environment 
was even more supportive. In 1998, UdeM and Polytechnique had created a university-transfer 
organization, Polyvalor (renamed Univalor in 2001), whose mission was to help academics 
manage the challenges associated with creating new ventures. Univalor relies on standard 
mechanisms of technology transfer, such as the compensation of researchers who develop an 
intellectual property, through sharing royalties, equity participation in academic start-ups, and 
licensing to established firms. With respect to the royalty-sharing rule, Univalor adopted a 
formula in which royalties are shared equally between the researchers who have contributed to 
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the development of the intellectual property and the university (Savary et al. 2002). Over time, 
Polytechnique Montréal and UdeM have become more involved in technological transfer, as the 
director of research and innovation at Polytechnique Montreal (and cofounder of ExPretio) 
explains:  
“The technological transfer mission [of Polytechnique Montréal] is relatively recent 
[…] but linkages with companies started 30 years ago. It took time to understand 
this equilibrium between fundamental research and research for common good and 
companies. There are people who […] distinguish between the common good and 
the good of companies, but […] companies are part of society […], so for us there is 
no opposition. We are here for the good of society and since we are engineers, it is 
for the good of companies, among others. This is how it goes. Today, this is well 
accepted at Polytechnique but it took 15 years” (Interview #11).  
The supportive institutional climate, however, does not mean that academic entrepreneurs 
do not have to engage in intense negotiation with their universities for intellectual property rights 
(Roy and Filion 2004a, 2004b). The GIRO entrepreneur team negotiated retroactive rights in the 
mid-1980s, because when GIRO was created, the university did not have a formal intellectual 
property policy (Roy and Filion 2005). GIRO eventually obtained the right to commercialize the 
GENCOL technology after a long series of discussions with the university:   
“There was not really a model here. It was not common to see companies emerge 
from research activities. It took a long time before we started negotiating formal 
agreements with the university. Then, we negotiated for a long time […]. The 
university did not know how to handle this. We did not know either. We told the 
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university: we will negotiate something that will be retroactive. Finally we arrived 
at an agreement in 1987” (Roy and Filion 2005, p. 6).  
In the case of AD OPT, complex intellectual property-rights negotiations with the 
university occurred in two steps. In the mid-1980s, the founders of AD OPT first negotiated the 
right to commercialize the software they had developed for the mining sector. They then 
concluded an agreement for the rights to GENCOL in the early 1990s, when they expanded the 
company’s activity to include the airline sector. This second round of negotiations proved more 
challenging because more organizations (e.g., HEC Montréal, Polytechnique Montréal, UdeM) 
were involved, and GIRO’s founders had already negotiated the right to commercialize the 
GENCOL technology in the public transit sector (Gratton et al. 2007). The Omega 
Optimization/Planora and ExPretio situations are different, because a formal intellectual property 
policy was in place when these companies were established.  
Academic entrepreneurs also face a challenge in transitioning to managerial roles. The 
academic entrepreneurs we study resolved this challenge in different ways. In three cases (Ad 
OPT, Omega Optimization/Planora, and ExPretio), they did not leave their universities to 
manage their ventures; they relied on surrogate entrepreneurs. Various reasons explain their 
choices. First, these academics were truly committed to their academic projects, and one of their 
primary motivations for creating the ventures was to secure external sources of funding so that 
they could pursue their research:   
 “Why commercialize to start with? I must admit, the objective was to help finance 
our research activities. Initially, our research group was made up of about 25 
students, research assistants, and postdocs. To finance all these people, we had to 
repeatedly apply for grants. So this helped. Second, there was the relevance of our 
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research. Even if we carry out fundamental research, it must someday be relevant. 
Third, there is the question of finding openings for our graduates. Fourth, this type 
of spin-off and university cooperation attracts students who are interested in 
industry. Let’s not hide it; only 20 to 25 percent of our graduates go into academia. 
So we have to prepare them” (Interview #11).  
Second, these academics did not necessarily have any interest in taking on managerial 
roles, such as CEO. As one of our interviewees said: “I am an academic, and I also am an 
entrepreneur, but there is a huge difference between being an entrepreneur and being a manager” 
(Interview #8). They were also usually convinced that they would be more effective in their 
academic roles than in managerial positions: when the lead academic becomes a manager, he 
(she) has less time to dedicate to his (her) research activities, which deprives the spin-off of one 
of its best resources (Interview # 5). Third, the policy adopted by UdeM and Polytechnique does 
not allow academic entrepreneurs to take on managerial roles if they want to keep their 
university positions (Savary et al. 2002).  
In the case of GIRO and INRO, the two academic entrepreneurs eventually took a 
managerial role in their companies and left their university jobs. The founder of GIRO quit his 
position as professor at UdeM 10 years after GIRO was established to become the company's 
vice president. The INRO founder stayed as a professor at UdeM for more than 30 years, and 
became CEO of INRO when he left the university in 2004.  
Third Critical Juncture: Market Credibility 
The third critical juncture, market credibility, refers to the “entrepreneur’s ability to gain access 
to and acquire an initial stock of resources, which are required for the business to begin to 
function” (Vohara et al. 2004, p. 164). The commercial exploitation of a research team's 
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technological assets usually requires funding. In the cases we study, the seed funding was 
limited, especially when compared to that required to launch biotechnological ventures. This 
explains why none of the spin-offs sought access to venture capital to launch a venture.  
Another important aspect of market credibility is the acquisition of key customers. In all 
five cases, the end users are companies, not individuals. Operating in the business-to-business 
market makes acquiring customers easier, because academic OR conferences often welcome 
representatives from industry and facilitate contacts between university researchers and potential 
users or industry partners (Interview #4). The specificities of the innovations developed in 
Montreal also explain why the market-credibility test was successful. Because these innovations 
were not disruptive innovations, a market already existed for the technologies. The innovators 
could thus show to potential clients that their technology performed better, or was better aligned 
with the customer's needs. The academic entrepreneurs in all five spin-offs were extremely clear 
about this specificity of their innovations and explained that they acquired market credibility by 
running their software using client data. They built their business cases by benchmarking their 
new software against the software that the client company was running:  
“[…] with a tactical product the client can construct his schedules with his old 
system, while you construct your schedules on your side. And, we put the two side 
by side. As he still has his old system, he quickly knows how much money he can 
save. This is benchmarking. The business decision is made on the business case, 
and when you develop a business case where people can save $25 million a year, 
they don’t care who you are! This is how we have made our way into the market” 
(Interview #5).  
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Overall, the acquisition of customers relied heavily on reputation and word of mouth, but 
also on active market research, partnerships with other organizations (e.g., Omega 
Optimization/Planora), and acquisitions (e.g., AD OPT).  
Fourth Critical Juncture: Attaining Sustainable Returns 
The final critical juncture refers to the ability to continuously reconfigure existing resources, 
capabilities, and social capital with new information, knowledge, and resources to ensure 
sustainable returns, that is, “revenues from customers for services or product sold, milestone 
payments from collaborative agreements of investment from existing or new investors” (Vohara 
et al. 2004, p. 166). 
The Montreal spin-off entrepreneurial teams had different approaches to reconfiguring 
their existing resources and capabilities to grow their companies. A sharp contrast exists between 
INRO and AD OPT. INRO is privately held, never relied on bank loans or venture capital, and 
opted for a pure organic growth (Interview #1); in contrast, AD OPT went public in the 1990s, 
and, in the 2000s, embarked on a series of acquisitions before Kronos acquired it. INRO's 
founder decided to grow the company by building internal capabilities; AD OPT grew by 
acquiring firms. The Omega Optimization/Planora case also differs, because this spin-off 
initially opted for slow, steady growth using local clients. But, in 2010, its founders radically 
changed their strategy: they turned to venture capital, and were later acquired by JDA, which 
turned the spin-off into its research lab.  
Summary 
Knowledge on efficiently managing the interface between academia and industry is crucial to 
maintaining the usefulness and relevance of OR. In this paper, we have reported on the cases of 
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five university spin-offs that academic entrepreneurs from the CIRRELT and GERAD 
established. These five ventures have distinct trajectories; however, all were created by OR 
academics who had developed innovative methods for solving complex scheduling problems.  
We can learn three lessons from these cases. First, in this paper, we show that being an 
academic entrepreneur is both exciting and challenging. Designing an innovative OR technology 
that wins academic awards is only one element in the story. Once they have decided to 
commercialize their innovation, academic entrepreneurs must overcome a series of critical 
junctures, which necessitate that they acquire a new set of skills. Beyond adapting the technology 
to market needs, they must include many types of partners, such as banks and customers, in their 
projects (Akrich et al. 2002). They also must accept that technology is not the only element that 
matters: “Technology is one thing but value proposition and go to market strategy are also 
important. It is not because as scientists we can ‘do’ something useful, that a significant number 
of customers will be willing to pay for this service” (Interview #8).   
Second, although we have focused on five spin-offs that commercialized sustaining 
innovations for which they needed no massive up-front capital, we showed that significant 
differences exist between these spin-offs. In all five cases, the acquisition of customers relied on 
benchmarking, reputation, and personal contacts. Yet, the trajectories of the spin-offs—in 
particular their approaches to dealing with their financial and managerial challenges—differed 
significantly: some founders decided to go public, and others preferred to grow their firms 
organically by developing internal resources and capacities.  
Finally, our paper shows that industry partnerships and a favorable institutional 
environment play a key role in creating sustainable university spin-offs. Without assistance from 
industry partners, none of the academic entrepreneurs we studied would have been able to create 
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its company. The institutional climate within the Montreal universities also positively 
contributed to the successful development of these ventures. In return, these universities have 
benefited from many positive externalities. As one of the cofounders of AD OPT said, when we 
asked him to reflect on his insights for initiating and growing a start-up: “The creation of a spin-
off has helped my team and me to further develop our research and to obtain external funding in 
order to conduct new research. It also helped us to create jobs for our students. Last, it is also a 
very lucrative venture, and a model for the next generation of OR researchers in Montreal” 
(Interview #5).   
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Tables  
Company 
[year 
founded] 
Opportunity Technology Main 
products 
Current growth 
phase 
Start-up investment IP Venture 
champion 
INRO 
Consultants 
[1976] 
To design, 
develop, and 
commercialize 
transport planning 
solutions  
Multimodal 
equilibrium 
EMME/2 
STAN 
Dynameq 
Sustainable return 
phase 
International market 
Privately owned 
n=35  
Only one funder, the 
lead academic.  
No partner involved 
 
University:  
IP license 
negotiated in 
1985 
One academic 
entrepreneur 
GIRO 
[1979] 
To design, 
develop, and 
commercialize 
software solutions 
for managing 
urban transport 
related operations 
Column 
generation 
(GENCOL)  
HASTUS 
GIRO / 
ACCESS 
GeoRoute 
Sustainable return 
phase
* 
International market 
Privately owned 
n=240  
No external funding 
in 1979. Early 1980s: 
research contracts 
and a CAD 400 000$ 
R&D loan from the 
Société Générale de 
Financement  
University:  
retroactive IP 
license in 
1987 after 
several years 
of 
negotiation 
One academic 
entrepreneur 
One surrogate 
entrepreneur 
(full time from 
1982) 
*
GIRO’s turnover was CAD$30M in 2010; the company founders and the senior management hold GIRO shares.  
Table 1: For each spin-off company we discuss in this paper, we show information pertinent to the company. 
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Company 
[year] 
Opportunity Technology Main 
products 
Current growth 
phase 
Start-up investment IP Venture 
champion 
AD OPT 
[1987] 
To design, 
develop, and 
commercialize 
crew planning 
optimization 
solutions for the 
airline industry 
Column 
generation 
(GENCOL)  
iBid 
Altitude 
suite  
Sustainable return 
phase; international 
market
* 
A division of Kronos 
since 2004 
n=200 
CAD$300 000 from 
two Canadian 
research funding 
bodies. Two 
companies gave 
CAD$150,000.  
Five entrepreneurs 
acted as guarantors 
and invested 
CAD$100 each.  
University:  
IP license  
Two rounds 
of 
negotiation 
(1986 and 
1992) 
Academic 
entrepreneurs 
and  
surrogate 
entrepreneurs 
*
AD OPT turnover was CAD$25M in 2003 (Gratton et al. 2007) 
 
Table 1 Cont’d  
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Company 
[year] 
Opportunity Technology Main 
products 
Current growth 
phase 
Start-up investment IP Venture 
champions 
Omega / 
Planora 
[2001] 
To design, 
develop and 
commercialize 
optimal 
workforce 
management 
solutions and 
personal 
scheduling 
systems for 
complex cases 
across market 
segments  
Constraint 
programming  
Planora 
(formerly 
OpTime) 
Growth phase 
International and 
regional markets 
Acquired by  
RedPrairie/JDA 
in 2012 
n=20 (before 
acquisition by 
RedPrairie/JDA) 
Two main sources of 
funding: Tax credit 
R&D (80%)  
Electronic trade credit 
(20%) 
Partnership with a web 
company previously 
funded by one of the 
lead funders of Omega 
The 
company 
was created 
when the two 
funders were 
still PhD 
students.  
No IP right 
to negotiate  
Two academic 
entrepreneurs,   
one surrogate 
entrepreneur 
(in 2007), and 
one industry 
partner 
Table 1 Cont’d  
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Company 
[year] 
Opportunity Technology Main 
products 
Current growth 
phase 
Start-up investment IP Venture 
champions 
ExPretio 
[2003] 
To design, 
develop and 
commercialize 
revenue 
management and 
pricing solutions 
for the rail and 
airlines industries 
Bilevel 
mathematical 
programming 
APPIA 
(formerly 
NetPro) 
Growth phase 
International 
market 
Privately owned 
n=35  
Four university 
professors were the 
main shareholders; they 
provided research time 
and expertise 
Research contracts from 
MITACS in 
collaboration with 
industry partners for 
CAD$ 400 000/year.  
Discussions 
with the 
University 
led to the 
conclusion 
that there 
were no IP 
rights to 
negotiate.  
Four academic 
entrepreneurs,  
two surrogate 
entrepreneurs, 
and one 
industry 
partner 
Table 1 Cont’d 
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Firm  Interviewee Role Affiliation*  Education Interview Date  
INRO  1  INRO Consultants Founder, President  
Professor Emeritus, UdeM 
CIRRELT PhD, Operations Research, 
Columbia University, 1969 
October 24, 2011 
INRO  2  VP, Development and Solutions  MSc, Engineering Systems, 
Technology and Policy, MIT, 2004 
October 24, 2011 
INRO  3  VP, Marketing   PhD, Operations Research, UdM October 24, 2011 
GIRO 4  GIRO founder, VP (1979-2000) 
Former UdeM Professor 
Former CRT director 
CRT PhD, Operations Research, MIT, 
1973 
October 24, 2011 and  
October 26, 2011 
AD OPT  5 AD OPT cofounder 
Professor, Polytechnique Montréal 
Former director of GERAD 
GERAD PhD, Informatics and OR, UdeM, 
1979 
October 14, 2011 
Table 2: For each of the 11 interviewees, we show role at the spin-off, research center to which the interviewee was affiliated at 
the time the spin-off was established, education, and date of interview.   
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Table 2 Cont’d  
Firm  Interviewee Role Affiliation  Education Interview Date  
AD OPT 6 Operations Research Architect at AD 
OPT, a division of Kronos 
GERAD PhD in Applied Mathematics & 
OR, Polytechnique Montréal, 1989 
October 25, 2011 
AD OPT  7 R&D team member at AD OPT, a 
division of Kronos 
GERAD PhD, Polytechnique Montréal, 2003 October 27, 2011 
Omega 8 Omega cofounder 
Professor at Polytechnique Montréal 
CIRRELT 
 
PhD, UdeM, 2003 December 10, 2011 
Omega 9  Omega Former president (Planora)    October 24, 2011 
ExPretio 10 ExPretio cofounder 
 
CIRRELT PhD, Operations Research, UdeM, 
1982 
June 10, 2011 
ExPretio 11  ExPretio cofounder 
 
CIRRELT & 
GERAD 
PhD Applied Mathematics & OR, 
Polytechnique Montréal, 1989 
October 14, 2011 
 
